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ABSTRACT
We analyze the eects of land market restrictions on the rural labor market outcomes for
women. The land restrictions can have a gender and age bias because of an ex-post asymmetry
in migration costs arising from older women's comparative advantage in home goods production.
For identication, we exploit a natural experiment in Sri Lanka where historical malaria played
a unique role in land policy. We provide robust evidence of a positive eect of land restrictions
on women's labor force participation, and negative eects on female wages. The empirical results
suggest that the burden of land market restrictions falls disproportionately on older women.
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(1) Introduction
There is a growing literature in economics that analyzes the eects of restrictions on land
market on household choices and outcomes. The literature has focused on the eects of restrictions
on the alienability of land on credit access, labor supply, agricultural productivity, and savings
(see, for example, Field (2007), Iyer at al. (2009)), and on the eects of uncertainty about
property rights to land on incentives to invest (see, for example, Besley (1995), Jacoby et al.
(2002), Goldstein and Udry (2008)). This paper deals with a set of issues that have largely been
ignored in the economics literature: the eects of land market restrictions on the labor force
participation of rural women and their wages.2
Do the eects of land market restrictions found in many developing countries have a gender
dierentiated eect? We use a simple general equilibrium model to sort out the potential eects
of land market restrictions on women.3 Our analysis shows that the increased migration costs
due to land market restrictions (especially sales restrictions) and women's comparative advantage
in producing home goods together imply that the burden of the restrictions fall disproportionately
on women. For maximization of the household income, it is optimal for men to migrate leaving
women behind in the farm to hold on to the land. This gender non-neutrality in the eects of land
restrictions holds even if there are no ex-ante gender dierences in the costs of migration before
the land restrictions, and the rural-urban wage dierential does not vary across gender. This
is so because land restrictions create ex-post dierential migration costs; the women face much
higher eective migration costs after the imposition of the restrictions. An important implication
of this gender non-neutrality is that the land market restrictions are likely to increase labor
force participation by women in rural areas compared to the counterfactual where there are no
restrictions on the alienability or rental of land. This `labor endowment eect' of land market
restrictions decreases the equilibrium wage in the local labor market.
2In a companion paper, we analyze the eects of land market restrictions on the spatial pattern of adult male
wages. Please see Emran and Shilpi (forthcoming).
3To the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical analysis on possible gender bias in the eects of land
market restrictions in the existing literature.
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Interpreting the increased labor force participation in rural areas as a sign of women's economic
mobility may, however, not be appropriate, as the increased labor force participation in rural
areas comes at the expense of migration and better jobs in urban areas. Land market restrictions
result in a negative income eect compared to the counterfactual where the family could sell the
land, and the woman could also migrate to the urban area. This negative income eect induces
women to participate in the labor force.4 To focus on the migration costs due to the land market
restrictions, we abstract away from the standard labor-leisure choice in the conceptual framework
below. However, the negative income eect will also inuence the labor supply, conditional on
participation. Thus the equilibrium wage observed in the data will be an outcome of responses
at both the extensive (participation) and intensive (labor-leisure choice) margins.
To identify the eects of land market restrictions on women's labor force participation and
wage, we take advantage of a historical natural experiment in Sri Lanka where the cross-section
variation in the incidence of land restrictions across dierent sub-districts (i.e., proportion of land
under policy restrictions) were primarily determined by historical malaria prevalence (endemic-
ity) through its eects on `crown land'. Historical malaria caused an exodus of households from
the aected areas during the 13-18th centuries, and the abandoned land was taken over by the
government during the colonial period and designated as crown land (Peebles (2006), De Silva
(1981)). The crown land was later distributed through settlements, and restrictions on sales,
mortgage and rental were imposed. The historical malaria thus is signicantly correlated with
the extent of land restrictions in an area through the availability of crown land. We exploit this
correlation between historical malaria and the incidence of land restrictions in a sub-district to
identify the causal eects of land restrictions. To be more precise, we rely on the interaction of
historical malaria and average rainfall across dierent sub-districts for identication in an em-
4One might think that the remittances sent by the husband constitute a positive income shock. Note that it is a
positive income shock for the counterfactual where the husband would not migrate in the equilibrium without the
land restrictions, but migrates under the restriction. This scenario is not possible. Moreover, our focus is on the
case where the women would migrate in the absence of land restrictions along with the men. This means that the
household income is lower under land restrictions because women cannot get higher income in urban labor market.
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pirical model with district xed eects. This approach uses subdistrict level rainfall as weights to
uncover variations in malaria across subdistricts from the district level average estimates avail-
able from Newman (1965) (see the discussion on empirical strategy in section 5 below). This
strategy is motivated by two considerations. First, the variation in land restrictions in the data
is at the subdistrict level and the interaction of district level malaria with the subdistrict level
rainfall provides an instrument that varies across subdistricts. Second, a large literature shows
that rainfall is one of the most important determinants of spatial variations in malaria in Sri
Lanka; the malaria incidence is lower in a subdistrict within a district if it has higher rainfall
((Clemesha, 1934; Rustomjee, 1944; Briet et al, 2008). As we discuss in detail later, we control
for rainfall in a subdistrict in the regressions to ensure that the exclusion restriction imposed is
credible. In addition, the interpretation that the interaction of historical malaria with subdistrict
rainfall provides an estimate of historical malaria variations across subdistricts implies testable
sign restriction in the rst stage regression, which is borne out by the empirical results reported
later. The strength of our identication strategy derives from the following observations: (i) the
timing of the malaria eradication program was determined by the technological breakthrough
abroad for tackling malaria (DDT), and thus can plausibly be treated as exogenous,5 (ii) a suc-
cessful nationwide malaria eradication program was implemented in sri Lanka in 1947; malaria
endemicity (as measured by enlarged spleen rates) fell close to zero by 1950-51.6 We thus rely
on historical malaria more than half a century ago to identify the eects of land restrictions, and
(iii) most of the current population in a subdistrict ravaged by high historical malaria were never
exposed to historical malaria there, as they were resettled from other relatively malaria free areas.
Possible objections to historical malaria prevalence as identifying instrument are: (i) histor-
ical malaria might have aected the quality of institutions (Acemoglu et al, 2001), (ii) it may
5Although DDT was rst synthesized in 1874, its insecticidal properties were discovered in 1939 by Swiss scientist
Paul H Muller. It was widely used during second World War to control malaria and typhus, and after the war DDT
was made available as an agricultural pesticide and for malaria eradication programs.
6Reported malaria cases in Sri Lanka were reduced from about 3 million per year during pre-eradication era to
only 29 in 1964 (Harrison, 1978). The number of malaria death cases were 30 in 2002 among a population of 21
million. The reported malaria death were 4 in 2003, and 0 in 2005.
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be correlated with adverse local conditions such as low productivity due to lack of irrigation.
It is important to appreciate that the long-term eects of malaria on the quality of institutions
emphasized in the cross-country literature are not relevant for our identication scheme. Identi-
cation in our case comes from variation across sub-districts within a district, whereas the relevant
institutions such as the legal system and the enforcement of contracts and property rights are
determined at the national level.7 To many readers, probably the most important identication
challenge we face is that the high land restrictions areas may be areas with adverse economic
characteristics and thus with low productivity, and the eects of low productivity can be wrongly
attributed to land restrictions. We address this issue in a variety of ways. In addition to including
a set of land productivity controls, we provide strong evidence that if anything land productivity
is higher in areas with high incidence of land restrictions, and conditional on observed produc-
tivity controls such as rainfall, slope, proximity to river and large city, actual land productivity
(measured by yield per acre for major crops) are not correlated with our identifying instrument,
i.e., interaction of rainfall and historical malaria. Section 5 provides detailed evidence on the
credibility of our identication strategy.
The empirical results show that the incidence of land market restrictions has a numerically
and statistically signicant eect on the labor force participation of women and their wages. The
higher the proportion of land under restrictions in a sub-district, the higher is the women's labor
force participation. Restrictions in the land market on the other hand reduce female wages.
The empirical analysis also indicates that the land market restrictions aect women's labor force
participation and wage primarily through the migration cost channel. A one percentage point
increase in the land under policy restrictions in a sub-district leads to about a 2.3 percent increase
in the labor force participation of women (evaluated at the mean). The corresponding estimates
for wages imply that a one percentage point increase in land under restrictions leads to a 1.7
7A district as an administrative unit is similar to a county in USA. The subdistrict is a small administrative
unit, the average land area of sub-districts in our sample is 160 square kilometers and the median is 110 square
kilometers.
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percent decrease in female wage. The empirical results suggest that the burden of land restrictions
falls disproportionately on older women whose labor force participation increases much more (2.9
percent) than that of younger women (1.8 percent).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the related literature and
places the contributions of the paper in perspective. The next section outlines a simple general
equilibrium model to help understand the eects of land market restrictions on rural labor markets
with a focus on the implications for migration costs and gender dierences. Section 4 discusses
data and variables denitions. Section 5 lays out the identication approach we use. Section
6, arranged in a number of subsections, report the results of the empirical analysis. The paper
ends with some concluding remarks.
2. Related Literature
The theoretical and empirical literature on labor markets in developing countries is rich with
many interesting and important insights (for theory see, for example, Mirrlees (1975), Stiglitz
(1976), Eswaran and Kotwal (1985)); for empirical contributions see, for example, Bardhan (1979,
1983, 1984), Foster and Rosenzweig (1993, 1994), and Ardington et al. (2009) ). The literature has
focused primarily on unemployment (open or disguised), rural-urban and international migration,
dualism or segmentation in the labor market, interlocking contracts across dierent markets, and
returns to education in the labor market. Women's labor force participation and labor supply in
developing countries has been analyzed in a number of empirical papers in the literature, see for
example, Eswaran et al. (2009), Cameron et al. (2001), and Khandker (1987). The focus of the
literature on labor force participation of women in developing countries has traditionally been on
the role played by factors such as education, health, marriage, fertility, and social norm.
There is a small but growing literature that looks at the eects of out-migration by husband
and adult children on economic decisions and welfare of left-behind woman (Amuedo-Dorantes
and Pozo (2006), Lokshin and Glinskaya (2008), Mu and Van de Walle (2009)). But they do not
explore the roles played by dierent factors that aect the costs of migration. Probably the closest
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precursor to our work is Mu and Van de Walle (2009) where they analyze the time allocation and
labor force participation of women in migrant households who are left-behind in the farm in rural
China. The costs of rural-urban migration in China is high primarily because of the household
registration system known as Hukou.8 But Hukou involves a lot more than the restrictions related
to land. When someone decides to move out of his/her own Hukou, he/she loses a bundle of
benets in addition to the land including access to schooling, subsidized inputs, access to jobs in
local government owned township and village enterprises.9 As a result, it is impossible to isolate
the role played by land market restrictions alone. We are thus not aware of any paper, theoretical
or empirical, in economics literature that addresses the issues we focus on here.
3. Conceptual Framework
To understand the eects of the land market restrictions on the labor market equilibrium in a
village, we consider a simple general equilibrium model of wage determination that incorporates
higher migration costs due to land restrictions. The focus is on the eects of the land market
restrictions on female labor force participation decision and wages. We provide the basic intuitions
for the theoretical results here, and refer the reader to the online appendix for a more complete
theoretical analysis.
Let dku  0 be the distance of village k from the urban center U: The equilibrium wages in
the urban center are given exogenously as wmu and w
f
u for male and female migrants respectively.
A member i of household h in village k incurs a cost of migration as follows:
'khi = '(kh; dku;Mkh; si) (1)
where kh is a dummy that takes on the value of 1 when a household is under land restrictions
andMkh is a vector of household specic determinants of migration cost and si is a gender dummy
8Mu and Van de Walle (2009) do not attempt to estimate the eects of Hukou, as their interest lies on the eects
of migration.
9An indication of wide reach of Hukou is that a person could get a marriage license only from his/her own
Hukou.
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that takes on the value of 1 when the migrant is a female. Following Hayashi and Prescott (2008),
we assume that the inability to sell the land and the threat of losing the rights to future earning
from it increases migration costs for the households. Thus the following holds:
'1kh = '(1; dku;Mkh; si)  '0kh = '(0; dku;Mkh; si) 8h (2)
The inequality above is strict at least for one household member. We assume that Mkh is
increasing in h and 'kh(:) is increasing in dku, and Mkh: So a household with higher h value
faces higher migration cost. A household is composed of two members: a male and a female. We
assume that, to avoid the additional cost of migration arising from land restrictions, the household
needs to leave at least one member back in the village. Thus the migration cost faced by the
rst member to migrate from a household under land restrictions is '0kh rather than '
1
kh:
The local labor market, for both men and women, satises two equilibrium conditions: the
rural-urban arbitrage condition (migration equilibrium condition), and the market clearing at the
local labor market. They jointly determine the equilibrium local wage and the threshold household
that is indierent between migrating and not migrating. In this set-up, we consider the eects of
land restrictions on the local labor market equilibrium. Consider village k where k proportion
of households are under land restrictions: It is convenient to think about three dierent groups of
households in the initial equilibrium to understand the eects of land market restrictions. They
are: (i) both members are in the village, (ii) only one member is migrant, and (iii) both members
are migrants in the initial equilibrium (i.e., without any land restrictions). 10
Note that if we x the wages at their initial equilibrium levels in the local labor market
(wm0k ,w
f0
k ); the imposition of land restrictions has no eect on the rst two groups, i.e., the
households which have at least one non-migrant in location k. However, even with unchanged
10We can have households with only one migrant (usually male) in a household even if the migration costs are
not gender specic (i.e., 'kh(:) function does not depend on si) , for example, when the rural-urban wage gap is
higher for male compared to female, i.e.,
 
wmu   wm0k
  wfu   wf0k  > 0.
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wages, land restrictions can aect the migration decision of the last group, i.e., where both
members nd it protable to migrate in the initial equilibrium. Facing land restrictions and
associated higher migration cost '1kh; at least one of the family member might nd it no longer
protable to migrate even if the equilibrium local wages remain the same.
A second, and more interesting point is that even when there are no dierences in migration
costs across male and female workers prior to the land restrictions, the eective migration costs
vary across gender once the land restrictions are imposed. To see this, assume that the migra-
tion costs are not gender specic. Now consider a migrant household whose land is under land
restrictions, and the female member is a participant in the labor force prior to the imposition
of the restrictions. The imposition of the land restrictions implies that a household will face
higher migration costs '1kh(:) + '
0
kh if both the workers migrate at the same time. In the case
where one of the workers migrates, the household incurs '0kh(:) as migration cost, as it can still
retain its land. Denote the new local wages after the land restrictions as wm and wf: As the
rst migrant, the gain from migration for a male worker is (wmu   wm)  '0kh(:) compared with
(wfu  wf)Lf  '0kh(:) for a female worker, where Lf < 1 is the female labor supplied to the
market after producing home goods. We assume that there are two goods: a home good and
a market good, and they are complementary in the household utility function. Also, the home
good is essential in the sense that utility is zero when home good consumption is zero. Only the
female member produces the home good, a simple formulation that captures the idea of women's
comparative advantage in producing the home good. The total labor endowment is normalized
to 1.11 Note that even if the rural urban wage gap is same for male and female migrants, the gain
from male migration unambiguously exceeds that from female migration, because Lf < 1; but a
male devotes the entire labor endowment to the market work. Thus, in general, the male member
will migrate rst from a household, and as a result the eective migration cost for the male will
be '0kh compared with '
1
kh for the female member. This ex-post asymmetry in migration costs
11We assume that the male member of the household inelastically supplies the total labor endowment to the
market. For tractability and to focus on the eects of migration, we abstract away from the labor-leisure decision.
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drives the main theoretical results where imposition of land restrictions lead to increased labor
force participation by women and lowers their equilibrium wage in the local labor market (see
proposition (1) below) relative to male wage.
The theoretical model so far considered households consisting of two adult members: one
male and one female. If we extend the model to include female of dierent ages, then the ex-post
asymmetry in migration costs may arise among the female members as well. To the extent older
women are primarily responsible for home production { as is the custom in much of South Asia
including Sri Lanka { one would expect ex post migration costs to be dierent between older
and younger women. Having an older woman in the household means less burden of provision
of home goods for younger women allowing them to participate and spend more time in outside
work. This in turn implies that migration costs imposed by land restrictions will be lower for
younger women compared with older ones. If this is so, then we expect land restrictions to have
larger impact on labor force participation of older women. As to the impact on wages, a change
in labor supply by anyone regardless of age could have general equilibrium eect particularly if
there is no segmentation in the labor market in terms of types of task performed by dierent age
cohorts. If, on the other hand, older and younger women perform dierentiated tasks in the labor
market allowing some degree of labor market segmentation, then we expect larger impact of land
restriction on wages of older women.
The analysis above leads to the following testable predictions summarized in the propositions
below. For a more fully developed theoretical analysis, please see the online appendix to this
paper.
Propositions
Assume that women are the sole producers of home goods, and home goods are essential and
complementary to the market goods in the utility function.
(1) Land restrictions raise female migration costs disproportionately compared with that of
male members resulting in an increase in women's labor force participation in rural areas.
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(2) Land restrictions raise migration costs of older women disproportionately compared with
that of younger women resulting in a larger increase in older women's labor force participation in
rural areas.
(3) Land restrictions reduce equilibrium wage for women in the local labor market.
4. Data and Variables Denitions
The main data source for the estimation of the female labor force participation and wages is
the Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 2002 (HIES, 2002) of Sir Lanka. We use the rural
sub-sample of HIES 2002. The HIES 2002 collected information from a nationally representative
sample of 16,924 households drawn from 1913 primary sampling units. The survey covered 17
of Sri Lanka's 25 districts, and 249 of its 322 Divisional Secretariat Divisions (DSDs).12 From
the 16,924 households in the survey, about 17140 females are in working age group (25 to 65
years). To dene our sample, we used three criteria: (i) we excluded age groups which may have
been exposed to historical malaria that aicted Sri Lanka before 1950; (ii) we focused on the
rural sample. The number of adult females who were born after 1950 and are currently residing
in rural areas is 10,850. The sample for the wage regressions are, however, smaller. Among
females in our main sample (10850), 42 percent are employed. About a third of those employed
are self-employed. We have thus complete information on wages and other relevant variables for
2918 females who were born after 1950 and live in rural areas. The dependent variable in wage
regression is deated using region specic consumer price index.
A key piece of information for our analysis is the amount of land under LDO restrictions in a
DSD. We draw this information from the Agricultural Census of 1998. We estimated percentage
of agricultural land under LDO leases (including permits and grants). The DSD identiers in the
HIES (2002) and Agricultural Census allow us to merge individual level data from HIES 2002
with data on percentage of land under LDO leases from Agricultural census. The geographic
12Data collection in the North and Eastern provinces was not possible due to on-going civil conicts at the time
of survey eld work.
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information including travel time from surveyed DSDs to major urban centers with population
of 100 thousand or more are drawn from the Geographical Information System (GIS) database.
The travel time is estimated using the existing road network and allowing dierent travel speed
on dierent types of roads.
A critical variable for our instrumental variables analysis is the historical district level malaria
prevalence rate. The data on historical malaria prevalence are taken from Newman (1965). The
measure for malaria prevalence used in this paper is called Gabaldon's endemicity index (see
column 2 in Table 4, P.34, Newman, 1965). This index is based on the estimates of enlarged
spleens in children due to malaria, and is a good indicator of the degree to which malaria is high
and permanent in a district. However, we need a measure of malaria variations at the subdistrict
level because the land restrictions vary at that level in the data. Also, we rely on district xed
eects in the IV regressions reported below in section 6 to control for unobserved land and labor
productivity dierences. Our approach to constructing an instrument that represents historical
sub-district level malaria incidence is to nd exogenous sub-district characteristic(s) that can
essentially be used as \weights" to recover the variations in malaria prevalence across dierent
sub-districts from the district average malaria data. A large literature on malaria in tropical
countries identify a few ecological characteristics that can potentially be used to generate the
sub-district level historical malaria estimates. Among the candidate ecological variables, rainfall
is perhaps the most reliable predictor of spatial malaria variation in the specic context of Sri
Lanka (Briet et al., 2003, 2008). We thus use rainfall in a sub-district as the relevant exogenous
characteristic to uncover the incidence of historical malaria across sub-districts. The eects
of rainfall on the incidence of malaria, however, can be dierent in dierent countries.13 In Sri
Lanka, the relationship between malaria and rainfall is negative across geographic space, as higher
rainfall washes out the breeding grounds of Anopheles Culicifacies, and Anopheles Subpictus, the
main malaria vectors in Sri Lanka (Clemesha, 1934; Rustomjee, 1944; Briet et al., 2008). An
13Many researchers in Asia found that rainfall reduces malaria incidence/prevalence by washing out the breeding
grounds of Anopheles mosquito (Wijesundera, 1988.)
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interaction of rainfall with historical malaria is used as an instrument in our empirical analysis.
As we discuss in the empirical strategy below, all regressions control for rainfall directly to capture
any productivity eect of rainfall.
The HIES 2002 also collected information on education, age, gender, ethnicity and religion.
The individual and household level explanatory variables are dened from the HIES 2002. HIES
2002 however did not collect information on health status of the household members. We draw
information on the chronic illness of household heads from HIES2006 data (Table A.20, p.99
in the nal report on HIES 2006/7). The information on anemia prevalence rate among non-
pregnant women is drawn from Demographic and Health Survey 2006/7 (Table6, p.19, DHS
report (2009)).14 The area characteristics including rainfall, slope, area and land quality are
drawn from various GIS data sources. Appendix Table A.1 provides summary statistics for all
variable included in our analysis.
Among 10850 women in our main sample, 51 percent participated in the labor force, with
42 percent employed and another 8.65 percent unemployed but seeking jobs. Though Sri Lanka
has a higher per capita income compared with rest of the South Asian countries, labor force
participation rate in Sri Lanka (51 percent) is somewhat larger than that in India (around 34
percent) but smaller than that in two poorest countries Bangladesh (57 percent) and Nepal (58
percent) (Chaudhuri, 2010). As opposed to other South Asian countries where work migration
among women is very limited due to social and cultural norms, Sri Lankan women are quite mobile
in search of jobs. For instance, about half of all emigrant workers in Sri Lanka are women (about
2.5 million women) and a large fraction of garment workers { the most important manufacturing
{ are also women who migrated from rural areas (Ukwatta, 2003). In the following section, we
discuss our empirical strategy.
14Anemia status was determined by haemoglobin level in blood. Anyone with haemoglobin level below 7.0g/dl
is classied as severely anemic, and with haemoglobin level between 7.0-10.p g/dl classied as having moderate to
mild anemia.
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5. Empirical Strategy
The core identication challenge is that the dierent sub-districts may dier systematically in
observed and unobserved dimensions, and when the unobserved characteristics are correlated with
both the incidence of land restrictions and the outcome variables across dierent sub-districts,
it may lead to omitted variables bias. The sources of omitted variables bias are likely to be
unobserved labor and land productivity heterogeneity.
5.1 Possible Sources of Bias
It is common for governments to impose restrictions on sales of land in settlement areas, and
settlement usually takes place in low quality marginal land. Also, historically private property
rights emerge rst in high productivity land. As a result, when we observe land under private
property rights to coexist with land under government restrictions, the land under restrictions
in general turns out to be of lower quality. A second important issue is the labor productivity
heterogeneity. Since lands under policy restrictions in Sri Lanka are mainly settlement lands, one
might worry that the people who were brought to these lands are of lower productivity due to
adverse human capital characteristics. Evidence from Sri Lanka however shows that land and
labor productivity is higher in areas under land policy restrictions.
Crop yield is a good summary statistic for land and labor productivity of an area. Crop
yields are found to be higher in land under policy restrictions for a number of dierent crops
including rice, the main crop in Sri Lanka ( please see Table 1 for details). There is no evidence of
adverse health conditions in areas under land restrictions. The correlations between two indicators
of health status { incidence of chronic illness and disability, and percentage of non-pregnant
women suering from dierent degrees of anemia { with proportion of land under restrictions
are statistically insignicant and mostly bear negative signs (please see Table 2). The higher
land productivity in areas under land restrictions are outcomes of Sri Lanka government's heavy
investment in irrigation development in resettled areas Similarly investments in health, education
and social services across the entire country successfully eliminated regional dierences in the
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labor productivity outcomes as well (Sen, 1981).
Higher productivity in a subdistrict, however, does not have unambiguous eects on women's
labor force participation and wage, because it can have conicting eects on the demand and
supply sides of the labor market. On the demand side, higher land/labor productivity increases
marginal productivity of labor and thus raises demand for labor and equilibrium wages. How-
ever, higher land quality also implies higher income for the land owning households which can
reduce labor force participation (and labor supply) by women because work outside the home is
associated with social stigma (Goldin (1995)). The bias from unobserved land and labor quality
thus depends on the net eect: if the labor demand shift due to higher productivity dominates,
the OLS estimates will tend to overestimate the eects of land restrictions on women's labor force
participation (because the causal eect is positive according to the theory), and underestimate
their eects on wage (because the causal eect is negative according to the theory).
Another potentially important issue is measurement error in the land restrictions variable
and the resulting `attenuation bias'. Thus the OLS estimates of the eects on both labor force
participation and equilibrium wages are likely to be biased toward zero.
5.2 Historical Malaria as a Natural Experiment
To estimate the eects of land restrictions on women's labor force participation and wage,
we need to nd a source of exogenous variation in the incidence of land restrictions in dierent
sub-districts. The unique role played by malaria infestation starting from 13th century till early
twentieth century in the history of land policy of Sri Lanka oers such an exogenous source of vari-
ations. The areas aected by historical malaria endemicity witnessed exodus of population and
abandonment of land (De Silva (1981)). The abandoned land was taken over by the government
and designated as `crown land' during the colonial period. The crown land was later distributed
after the independence in 1948 under Land Development Ordinance of 1935, and restrictions on
sales, mortgage, and rental were imposed (henceforth called LDO restrictions). Since the amount
of crown land available in a sub-district was historically determined by the intensity of malaria,
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the historical malaria incidence created exogenous variations in the incidence of land restrictions
in a sub-district; the proportion of land under restrictions is higher in a sub-district, the higher
was the intensity of historical malaria prevalence.15
An important part of our empirical strategy is to use district xed eects to control for time-
invariant land and labor productivity factors which are the main sources of omitted variables bias.
This precludes the use of district level malaria variation for identication. More important, we need
an instrument that can provide variations at the subdistrict level to explain the incidence of land
restrictions which varies across dierent subdistricts. Also, the district average is likely to smooth
out a large part of the identifying variation in historical malaria across dierent subdistricts, and
thus may result in weak instrument problem. This is important because there were signicant
variation in the historical malaria endemicity across dierent sub-districts within the same district.
For example, in Jana district, the Jana city was almost malaria free while the south Jana
suered from severe malaria in early 1930s (Newman (1965), p. 35). To uncover this variation
across sub-districts in a district, we exploit the correlation between rainfall and malaria by using
interaction of these two terms as instrument. As discussed in the data and variables section above
(section 4), rainfall is one of the most important exogeneous ecological determinant of malaria in
Sri Lanka, and the higher the rainfall in a DSD in a district, the lower is the malaria incidence
compared to the other DSDs in the district, because rainfall washes away the breeding grounds
(standing waters in ponds, canals, marshes etc.) of the main malaria vectors (see, for example,
the discussion on the eects of rainfall on historical malaria in (Clemesha, 1934; Rustomjee,
1944). Thus the interaction of district level malaria estimate with DSD level rainfall in the rst
stage regression of the incidence of land restrictions that includes district xed eects will have
a negative sign, if the interaction in fact represents variation in historical malaria across DSDs.
15One potential worry is that the households facing historical malaria might have abandoned land selectively
which can create a negative correlation between the extent of land restrictions in a sub-district and its land quality,
because one would expect a household to abandon the low quality lands rst. However, as discussed earlier, the
lands under the restrictions are of higher quality, which implies that we do not need to worry about such selective
land abandonment. We thank Michael Clemens for raising this point.
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This a priori sign restriction is useful for our identication strategy, because one might worry that
the interaction represents primarily variation in productivity due to rainfall dierences across
DSDs, instead of variations in historical malaria across DSDs within a district. Note that we
directly control for rainfall in the regressions, but if our instrument is still picking up productivity
eects of rainfall, we would nd a positive coecient on the interaction of malaria and rainfall at
the DSD level in the rst stage regressions. This is because productivity is higher in high land
restrictions areas, as discussed earlier, and higher rainfall increases crop yield. The sign of the
instrument in the rst stage thus provides us with a way to check whether the interaction based
instrument captures the variations in historical malaria across DSDs.
5.3 Potential Objections to Identication Strategy
There are a number of possible objections to our identication scheme which we discuss below.
A legitimate concern is that the sub-district level historical malaria might proxy for the direct
eect of rainfall on the labor market, especially in the agricultural sector. To make sure that our
instrument (rainfall weighted historical malaria) does not capture the direct eect of rainfall on
the labor market, we control for rainfall in a sub-district directly in all of the IV regressions.16
In addition to rainfall, regressions control for slope (steeper slope means less standing water and
less malaria), share of paddy land in total agricultural land and a dummy indicating whether the
DSD is within 5 km of a river (land productivity). The district level xed eects are also included
to control for land and labor productivity heterogeneity. As discussed before, land productivity
as measured by yield is not lower in high land restriction areas. Evidence in Table 1 also indicates
that conditional on exogenous indicators of land productivity (rainfall, slope and nearness to river
dummy and district xed eects), our instrument is not correlated with crop yields. This is strong
evidence in favor of the identication scheme.
16Since rainfall is conducive to rice cultivation, one might worry that they might aect the cropping mix in a
subdistrict. We thank Andy Foster for raising this point. To the extent crops dier in terms of their labor intensity,
it might aect demand for labor. The rainfall as control should pick up the resulting variation in labor demand
across sub-districts. As an additional check, we later report IV results that control for share of paddy land.
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Another important objection to the identication strategy comes from the recent literature
on institutions and growth that shows that historical malaria can aect the quality of institutions
through its inuence on settler mortality (Acemoglu et al, 2001). However, it is important to
appreciate that the long-term eects of malaria on the quality of institutions emphasized in the
cross-country literature are not relevant for our identication scheme. Because identication in
our case comes from variations in historical malaria across sub-districts within a district, as we
use district xed eects.17 The relevant institutions such as legal system and enforcement of
contracts and property rights, however, are determined at the national level. As an additional
precaution, we also control for the proportion of Sinhalese population in a sub-district as a measure
of ethno-linguistic fractionalization that can potentially aect public goods provision.18
A further concern is that historical malaria may have aected human capital of current labor
force adversely in our sample. There are good reasons to believe that this is not the case. First,
and probably the most important, is the fact that the settlement schemes brought in people from
relatively malaria free regions to the subdistricts which were abandoned because of historical
malaria. As a result, vast majority of the current population were never exposed to historical
malaria in the sub-district of their current residence (i.e, residence in 2002). Second, we exclude
the cohorts that were potentially exposed (in utero or post-natal) to historical malaria in Sri
Lanka.19 Thus our sample is not contaminated by the possibility that someone might have been
exposed to historical malaria before his/her mom resettled in a historical malaria ravaged sub-
district.20 The upshot of the above discussion is that historical malaria in a sub-district should
not be correlated with the health outcomes of most of the current population. Indeed, evidence
17A district as an administrative unit is similar to a county in USA.
18We, however, do not nd any evidence that ethnolinguistic fractionalization is correlated with the incidence
of land restrictions across sub-districts in Sri Lanka. A regression of proportion of land under restrictions on a
constant and share of Sinhalese population yields a coecient close to zero (-0.002) with a very low t statistic
(-0.33).
19Since malaria exposure in utero can have eects on adult health and education, we exclude cohorts born before
1950, even though nationwide malaria eradication was implemented in 1947.
20Note that the probability of such exposure is not high as malaria endemicity was much lower in the sub-districts
from where the people were resettled.
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in Table 2 conrms that the interaction of historical malaria and rainfall is not correlated with
the current health conditions (measured by anemia and chronic illness/disablity). To allay the
concern that historical malaria might pick up the current malaria infections, we control for recent
malaria incidence (both Plasmodium Vivax and Plasmodium Falciparum infection rates).
6. Empirical Results
(6.1) OLS Estimates
We start with the simple OLS results for alternative sets of controls and samples. Regressions
include a set of individual and household level controls, area-specic controls, and a dummy
for estate (tea plantation). The estate dummy captures variation in economic opportunities
particularly for women as tea estates in Sri Lanka employ primarily women workers. The distance
to the nearest city plays a double role; it represents the standard migration costs due to transport
and search, but it may also capture dierences in economic structure, as the composition of
output and pattern of crop specialization in a village economy depend on the access to urban
markets (Emran and Shilpi (2012)). The area-specic controls include share of Sinhalese (main
ethnic group in the country), number of cases of Plasmodium Vivax and Plasmodium Falciparum
infections in 2002. The set of individual and household level controls vary slightly depending on
the dependent variable of regression. Most regressions also include land productivity controls such
as average rainfall, average slope, a dummy indicating whether sub-district is within 5 kilometer
of a river, and proportion of land devoted to paddy and district level xed eects. In addition to
capturing unobserved land and labor heterogeneity, the district xed eects also control for any
formal or informal institutional dierences across areas which might be relevant for labor market.
All standard errors reported in this paper are corrected for heteroskedasticity and clustered at
DSD level.
The regressions for labor force participation are reported in columns 1 and 2, and for wage in
columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 respectively. The wage regressions correct for selection into employment
as labor force participation rate among women is about 51 percent. The estimates of Table 3
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exploit heteroskedasticity for identication following a growing econometric literature that shows
that identication can be obtained without any exclusion restrictions if there is heteroskedasticity
in the participation equation (Schaner (2002), Lewbel (2012), Klein and Vella (2009)). As
shown by Schaner (2002) and Klein and Vella (2009), heteroskedasticity eectively induces an
exclusion restriction even if there is no external instrument available.21 The second approach
we take imposes explicit exclusion restriction following Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008) who use
numbers of infants and toddlers as instruments for sample selection correction in female wage
equation (the corresponding OLS results are omitted for the sake of brevity).22
The specications in columns 1 and 3 of Table 3 include controls for individual and household
characteristics, a dummy for estate (mainly tea) and distance to the nearest large city but do not
include land productivity controls or district xed eects. We include individual and household
level characteristics that are expected to aect a women's reservation and actual wages; age (in
log), marital status, education level (log) and indicators of dierences in stigma eect of women's
work (religion and ethnicity). The labor force participation regression includes a squared term for
education as education is observed to have non-linear eect on participation decision. The simple
OLS regressions indicate no signicant correlations between land restrictions and women's labor
force participation and wage. These regressions, however, do not control for any agro-climatic or
other indicators of productivity such as rainfall. Thus potential negative eect of land restrictions
may be oset by the omitted productivity eects.
The next specications (columns 2 and 4) add geographic (slope, proximity to river), agro-
climatic (rainfall), and land productivity (share of paddy land) variables to the specication in
columns 1 and 3. They also include district level xed eects. The estimated partial correlation
between land restrictions and women's labor force participation is positive, large in magnitude
21For recent applications of heteroskedasticity based identication, see, for example, Chowdhury et al. (2014),
Emran and Hou (2013), Emran and Shilpi (2012), Emran et al. (2014), Mallick (2011).
22We, however, present the results that include number of infants and toddlers as an identifying instrument of
the selection equation as part of the robustness checks of the main IV results.
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(0.28) and statistically signicant at the 1 percent signicance level.23 The estimated partial
correlation (-1.42) in the case of wage is on the other hand negative and statistically signicant at
the 1 percent level. The estimates in column 2 and 4 thus provide some preliminary indication that
the omitted land and labor productivity may bias the estimates of the impact of land restrictions
on women's labor force participation and wage toward zero.
(6.2) Estimates from the Instrumental Variables Approach
The OLS regressions in Table 3 provide some interesting preliminary evidence on the eects
of land restrictions on women's labor force participation and wages. However, the estimates are
likely to be biased due to unobserved heterogeneity and measurement error. To correct for the
possible bias in the estimates in Table 3, we use the instrumental variables approach developed
in section (5) above. We use the most complete specications in columns 2 and 4 of Table 3
for the instrumental variables estimation. Table 4 reports the main results from the instrumental
variables approach. The rst row shows the IV estimates of the eects of land restrictions on
women's labor force participation and wages, and the following four rows report the rst stage
regressions and diagnostics for the relevance of the instrument.
The rst stage results show that historical malaria incidence at the subdistrict level has ex-
cellent power in explaining the variation in the incidence of land restrictions (proportion of land
under restrictions), even after district xed eects are included. The lowest Kleibergen-Paap
F statistic for the exclusion of the instrument are 11.99 across the four IV regressions in Table
4, implying that all of the F statistics are larger than the Stock-Yogo critical value 9.08 for 10
percent maximal relative bias.24 The sign of the instrument (interaction of district malaria with
DSD rainfall) in the rst stage regressions is negative across all four regressions. As discussed
before, this can be interpreted as strong evidence that the interaction of rainfall with historical
23The pattern of the estimates from the probit models for labor force participation are similar to the ones from
OLS and are omitted for the sake of brevity.
24We use the critical value for 3 instruments, as Stock-Yogo (2005) do not report the critical value for 2 instru-
ments.
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malaria in fact captures the variation in historical malaria across DSDs (after employing district
xed eects); if the interaction represents direct productivity eects of rainfall instead, we should
have observed a positive coecient on the instrument in the rst stage regression. This provides
additional evidence that conditional on district xed eects, subdistrict rainfall, and a rich set of
controls in the IV regressions, the exclusion restriction imposed on the rainfall weighted historical
malaria is credible.
Columns (1) and (2) in the rst row of Table 4 reports the estimated causal eects of land
restrictions on women's labor force participation. The specication in column (2) adds number of
infants and toddlers as additional regressors. The estimated eect of land restrictions on women's
labor force participation is statistically signicant at the 1 percent level, and the magnitudes (1.05
and 1.04) are signicantly larger than the corresponding OLS estimates.
Columns (3) and (4) in row 1 of Table 4 present the 2SLS estimates of the eects of land
restrictions on female wage. The wage regressions include a selection term to correct for self
selection into the labor force. The specication in column 3 exploits heteroskedasticty in the
participation equation following a growing econometric literature that shows that identication
can be obtained without any external instruments when there is heteroskedasticity in the selection
equation (Schaner (2002), Lewbel (2012) and Klein and Vella (2009, 2010). Since the selection
equation is a binary choice model, one can argue that it is identied from the nonlinearity of the
normal CDF. However, it is well-appreciated in the literature that such identication is weak,
as it relies on the data variation in the tails of the distribution (Altonji et al. (2005)). When
there is heteroskedasticity, it allows us to exploit the observations from the middle part of the
distribution which is approximately linear, and thus the resulting identication is no longer weak
(for a discussion, see Klein and Vella (2009)). The specication in column 4 on the other hand
utilizes the number of infants and toddler as identifying instrument in the selection equation
following Mulligan and Rubinstein (2008).
The estimated eect of land restrictions on female wage as reported in column (3) is negative,
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numerically substantial (-1.54) and statistically signicant at the 5 percent level (row 1). The
estimate using the alternative selection correction scheme reported in column 4 also suggests
statistically signicant (at 1 percent level) and negative (-1.78) eect of land restrictions on
female wage. The IV estimates of the eects of land restrictions on female wage are numerically
(in absolute magnitude) larger than the OLS estimates reported in Table 3 (column 4). The IV
estimates for both labor force participation and wage seem to justify the worry that the OLS
estimates are signicantly biased toward zero due to omitted variables and measurement error.
(6.3) IV Estimates: Robustness Checks
In this subsection we report a number of robustness checks for the IV estimates reported in
Table 4. Table 5 reports the results from the robustness checks. The upper panel reports the
robustness checks for labor force participation and lower panel for wage regressions. All of the
estimates for labor force participation in Tables 5 are based on the specication in column (1) of
Table 4. For wages, the specication corresponds to column 3 of Table 4.
The rst robustness check deals with the issue of potential correlation between farm size and
unobserved land productivity in a sub-district.25 If productivity varies systematically with farm
size, then it can aect labor demand and hence labor force participation and wages directly. The
IV regression in column (1) of Table 5 controls directly for farm size and results indicate no
signicant change in the estimated eects of land restrictions on labor force participation and
wages.
A related concern is that historical malaria and its eradication in 1947 may have aected the
population of a sub-district through migration and re-settlement. Such population movements
may have aected the density of economic activities and hence our dependent variables. Note
that the regressions already control for travel time to the larger cities which is a reliable predictor
of density of economic activities. In addition we include population density of a sub-district in an
25Note that farm size may not be an appropriate control because it can be the outcome of land restrictions. As
land restrictions aect land/labor ratio, it can aect the farm size in a subdistrict.
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IV regression, and the results reported in column 2 of Table 5 indicate little change in parameter
estimates.
In the IV regressions reported Table 4, travel time to the nearest large city (with population
of 100 thousands or more) is used to control for the eects of remoteness from urban markets.
One might argue that focusing on a single city (even if the largest) may not capture the extent of
the market households in a village have access to. Column 3 of Table 5 reports the IV estimates
from a specication that includes urban population within 5 hours of travel time as a measure of
the relevant market. The estimated eects of land restrictions are again nearly unchanged for
both labor force participation and wage regressions.
Column (4) of Table 5 addresses the question whether the negative eect of land restrictions
can partially reect heterogeneity in the availability of non-farm opportunities. The estimate,
after controlling for the share of non-farm employment in a village (PSU), is 1.15 (with a P-value
of 0.00) for labor force participation and -1.35 (p-value=0.05) for wage. One should however
interpret these estimates with caution, as non-farm activities are likely to respond to the incidence
of land restrictions, and thus may be a `bad control' a la Angrist and Pischke (2009), when the
focus is on estimating the causal eects of land restrictions on equilibrium wages.
An additional concern is that eradication of historical malaria in 1947 may have induced
private investment in land improvement aecting labor demand in post-eradication periods.26
This, however, has not been the case in Sri Lanka. In the case of lands under restrictions which
were distributed under the Land Development Ordinance Act, government invested massively
in the development of large-scale irrigation systems as well as other land improvements prior
to distributing these lands to private individuals. Treating all irrigation investment as private
investment, we include proportion of agricultural land irrigated in a subdistrict as an additional
control in the IV regression. The results in column 5 of Table 5 again show some change in the
estimates of the eect of land restrictions on female labor force participation and wages though
26It is important to appreciate that positive land or labor productivity improvements cannot explain our result
that land restrictions have a negative eect on wages; such productivity increases would result in higher wages.
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in opposite direction. Even after inclusion of irrigation, the estimates suggest numerically and
statistically signicant impacts of land restrictions on female labor force participation and wages.
As in the case of non-farm employment, irrigation qualies as a `bad' control since land restriction
may aect private investment in irrigation directly.
Finally we check the sensitivity of the estimates with respect to the inclusion/exclusion of
DSDs with very high incidence of land restrictions; are the estimates driven by a few outliers in
the right tail? Column (6) of Table 5 reports the estimates from a sample that excludes sub-
districts with proportion of land under restrictions more than 30 percent. The restricted sample
has 212 DSDs and thus loses 30 out of a 242 DSDs in the full sample. The estimated eects are
signicant at 5 percent or less and much larger in magnitudes (1.73 for labor force participation,
and -2.01 for wage).
The results in Tables 5 are very reassuring; although the precise numerical magnitudes of
the estimated eects of land restrictions on women's labor force participation and wages vary
somewhat across dierent specications, the estimates for the full sample fall within reasonably
tight bounds. The range of estimates are [0.85, 1.15] for women's labor force participation, [{1.39,
-1.56] for female wage.
(6.4) Eect of Land Restrictions by Age Cohort
The conceptual framework highlighted how greater role of older women in the provision of
home good can increase their migration costs disproportionately, which in turn implies a greater
labor force participation for them compared with younger women in response to land restrictions.
In this subsection, we check if there is indeed heterogeneity in the way land restrictions aect labor
force participation and wage of women of dierent age cohorts. We split the sample into two age
groups: older women [age > 40 years] and younger women [25-40 years]. Columns 1 and 2 of Table
6 report the IV results for labor force participation and columns 3 and 4 report that for wages.
The results in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 are interesting: the estimated eect land restrictions
on labor force participation becomes smaller as the age declines. The land restrictions have
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statistically signicant and positive eects on the participation rates of both groups of women,
but the magnitude of eect is larger for older women (1.33) compared with younger women (0.86).
The pattern of the estimates between age groups is consistent with what one would expect when
older women play a greater role in the provision of home goods. For wages, the IV results suggest
signicant negative eects for both groups, and the absolute magnitude of the eect is slightly
larger for the older women. The results for wages are consistent with the case where tasks done
by older and younger women in the labor market are only mildly dierentiated. The robustness
checks (not reported here for brevity) shows that the patterns reported above hold for other age
cohorts as well.
The labor force participation pattern reported in Table 6 also provides convincing evidence that
the estimates of eects of land restrictions are not picking up any omitted intergenerational health
eect emanating from transmission of parental exposure to malaria. One would expect health of
older age cohort to have been aected more adversely due to intergenerational transmission of
historical malaria's eect on parental health. To the extent bad health aects female labor force
participation adversely, one should expect to nd a smaller eect of land restrictions on labor force
participation for older age cohorts compared with that of younger age cohorts if our identication
scheme is compromised by such intergenerational health eects. The results in Table 6 are quite
the opposite. This, however, may not be surprising to a keen observer of impressive achievements
in health, nutrition and education across the board during the post eradication period, thus
osetting any lingering intergenerational eects (for a discussion, please see for example, Sen
(1981)).
(6.5) Understanding the Channel(s): Migration Costs vs. Credit Access
The results discussed so far provide strong evidence that the land market restrictions aect
women's labor force participation and wages signicantly. The evidence is consistent with the
theoretical analysis in section (3) above that identies rural-urban migration as the main channel
through which the land market restrictions work. But an alternative causal mechanism familiar
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from a substantial literature is that land restrictions, especially restrictions on alienability of land,
aect demand for labor in the local labor market through a reduced access to formal credit at
lower interest rate. It is thus natural for a reader to ask if we can exclude such credit channel as
an explanation for the results.
The results reported so far are, however, not consistent with an important credit and interest
rate channel for the land market restrictions. A lower access to formal credit can have conicting
eects on the demand for labor. On the one hand, a higher interest rate faced in the informal
sector would lead to capital-labor substitutions in favor of relatively cheaper labor, and thus
increase the demand for labor in a sub-district with higher proportion of land under restrictions.27
The equilibrium wage in this case will be higher along with higher level of employment in the
rural areas. The fact that we nd very robust evidence of a negative eect of land restrictions on
equilibrium wage casts strong doubts on the relevance of such interest rate channel in our case.
However, at least in some cases, the capital and labor may be complementary. For example,
if lower access to credit reduces the adoption of new seed technology in agriculture, this might
reduce demand for labor.28 Such reduction in demand for labor reduces the wage, but is also
expected to reduce the employment and labor force participation by women which contradicts
our ndings.
(6.6) Economic Signicance
Are the estimated eects economically important enough to warrant attention? A 10 percent
increase in the land under restrictions starting from a mean incidence level of restrictions increases
women's labor force participation by about 2.3 percent according to the estimate in Table 4. The
mean level of land restrictions in our data set is about 11 percent, thus a 10 percent increase
in the land under restrictions is equivalent to an increase of about 1 percentage point for an
average sub-district. A close to 2.3 percent increase in the labor force participation due to a 1
27The farmers would not nd it protable to adopt labor saving technologies such as tractors and thrashing
machines.
28Most of the existing evidence shows that the green revolution increases demand for labor.
26
percentage point increase in the land restrictions is not a small eect given that the mean labor
force participation rate for women in our sample is 51 percent. The estimates for female wage
imply that a one percentage point increase in land under restrictions reduces wage by about 1.7
percent. The average annual real wage for women is Rs. 51133 in our sample. A 1 percentage
point increase in land under restrictions decreases annual wage by Rs.866 (evaluated at the mean
so that the area of land under restrictions goes up from 11 percent to 12 percent). The ocial
poverty line annual expenditure for 2002 was Rs.17076, and food poverty line was Rs. 11676. The
reduction of wage due to a percentage point increase in land under restrictions accounts for 5.1
percent of ocial poverty line expenditure and 7.4 percent of food poverty line expenditure. The
results thus indicate that the eect of land market restrictions on female wage is substantial.
7. Conclusions
This paper examines the eects of land market restrictions on female labor force participation
and wages in a rural labor market. Our theoretical analysis shows that the land restrictions can
create dierential migration costs for women particularly for older women even if there are no ex-
ante dierences in migration costs before the imposition of the restrictions. The land restrictions
also result in a negative income shock compared to the counterfactual where the women could
follow their men to the urban areas by selling the land. These two eects together imply that
women's labor force participation increases with the incidence of land market restrictions in a
sub-district. The analysis also yields interesting testable predictions regarding the eects of land
restrictions on wages.
We use a historical quasi experiment in land policy in Sri Lanka to estimate the eects of
land market restrictions on the local labor market. The IV estimates that exploit the historical
natural experiment show that the eect of land restrictions on women's labor force participation
is numerically substantial and statistically signicant at the 1 percent level. According to the
IV estimates, when the land restrictions increase by 1 percentage point (starting from a mean
level of restrictions), it increases women's labor force participation by close to 2.3 percent. The
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corresponding estimate is 1.7 percent reduction in the wage for women. The results also suggest
a greater burden of land market restriction on older women. To the best of our knowledge,
the theoretical and empirical analysis presented in this paper is the rst attempt in economics
literature to understand the eects of land market restrictions on women's labor force participation
and wage in rural areas of a developing country.
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   Table 1: Relationship between historical malaria and current productivity (yield) 
  
        
  Rice Cassava Banana Ground Nut Other Oilseeds 
Proportion of Area Under 
LDO 1,589** -1,513 -1,645 843.5*** -314.1 
  (2.058) (-0.736) (-1.417) (3.593) (-0.275) 
Malaria Incidence*rainfall -0.386 -14.24 -2.003 -0.574 -1.77 
  (-0.105) (-1.541) (-0.366) (-0.400) (-0.325) 
Observations 118 90 98 57 101 
Note: Regressions control for rainfall, average slope, proportion of irrigated land and dummy for within 5 km of a 
river. 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 2: Land under Restrictions, Historical Malaria and Health Status 
 
      
 
Anemia among non-pregnant women 
% suffering Chronic 
Illness/disability 
  Mild/Moderate Severe Any Male Female All 
Proportion of Area Under LDO -27.82 1.859 -25.96 -4.912 -9.060 6.093 
  (-1.017) (1.139) (-0.966) (-0.576) (-1.474) (0.372) 
Malaria Incidence*rainfall -0.240 1.05e-02 -0.230 7.30e-03 -1.48e-02 3.79e-02 
  (-1.626) (1.117) (-1.581) (0.150) (-0.397) (0.409) 
Robust t statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Land market restrictions, Female Labor Force Participation and Wages 
OLS Regression Results 
          
 
Labor Force 
Participation Log(Real Annual wage) 
  1 2 3 4 
Proportion of area under LDO -0.0148 0.280*** -0.240 -1.424*** 
  (-0.150) (2.752) (-1.058) (-6.931) 
Travel Time to Large City 0.0187*** 0.00944* -0.0594*** -0.0512*** 
 
(3.862) (1.911) (-5.235) (-3.821) 
P. vivax (current malaria cases) 
 
0.0696 
 
-0.563* 
  
(0.521) 
 
(-1.778) 
P. Falciparum (current malaria cases) 
 
0.151 
 
0.417 
  
(0.362) 
 
(0.478) 
Share of Sinhalese in population 
 
0.121* 
 
-0.483*** 
  
(1.899) 
 
(-3.210) 
Average Rainfall 
 
-8.53e-06 
 
7.08e-05 
  
(-0.390) 
 
(1.415) 
Average slope 
 
0.00281 
 
-0.0173*** 
  
(1.248) 
 
(-3.850) 
River within 5 km (yes=1) 
 
-0.00469 
 
-0.000740 
  
(-0.251) 
 
(-0.0149) 
Share of land allocated to paddy 
 
-0.0815** 
 
0.0643 
    (-2.123)   (0.808) 
Estate (yes=1) 0.206*** 0.214*** -0.142 -0.471*** 
  (6.179) (5.661) (-1.403) (-5.246) 
Selection Term 
  
1.032*** 2.474*** 
      (4.804) (9.722) 
Observations 10,850 10,850 2,918 2,918 
Individual/household characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Fixed Effect No Yes No Yes 
All regressions include individual's age, education, marital status, and dummies for household's religion/ethnicity 
Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at the sub-district level (DSD) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 4: Land market restrictions, Female Labor force participation and Wages 
IV Regression Results 
   
    
 
Labor Force 
Participation Log(Real Annual wage) 
  1 2 3 4 
Proportion of Area Under LDO 1.046*** 1.032*** -1.541** -1.778*** 
  (2.658) (2.657) (-2.308) (-2.672) 
First stage Regressions 
    Malaria*Average Rainfall -0.0439*** -0.0440*** -0.0433*** -0.0425*** 
  (-3.463) (-3.465) (-3.656) (-3.587) 
Relevance of Instruments 
    Kleibergen-Paap/Angrist-Pischke F 11.99 12.01 13.37 12.87 
Stock-Yogo 10% max. rel. IV bias 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 
Controls 
    Individual characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household Composition No Yes No Yes 
Area characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
District Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
(1) All regressions include full set of regressors as in columns (2) and (4) of Table 3. 
(2) Column 2 includes hosuehold composition (no. of infant and kids) as controls 
(3) Selection term in column 3 is defined in terms of heterocedasticity in the participation equation 
(4) Selection term in column 4 is defined using numbers of infants and kids as exogenous controls in participation 
regression. 
(5) Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at sub-district (DSD) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 5: Land Market Restrictions, Female Labor Force participation and Wages: Robustness Checks for IV 
Results: Estimates from 2SLS 
 
            
 
Labor Force Participation 
 
Additional Controls   
 
Farm  Size Populaion Pop. in 5 hrs  Non-farm Irrigation LDO less 
  
Density travel time Share 
 
than 30% 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
 Area Under LDO 1.042*** 0.971** 1.061*** 1.149*** 0.847** 1.732*** 
  (2.639) (2.433) (2.743) (2.802) (2.236) (3.245) 
Instrument Strength  
      Angrist Pischke F 11.98 11.27 13.24 11.83 10.84 9.326 
Stock-Yogo 10% bias 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 
No. Of Observations 10850 10850 10850 10850 10850 9767 
 
Log(Real Wage) 
 Area Under LDO -1.556** -1.481** -1.511** -1.351** -1.388* -2.014** 
  (-2.339) (-2.192) (-2.273) (-1.960) (-1.881) (-2.343) 
Instrument Strength  
      Angrist Pischke F 13.50 12.53 15.32 13.18 11.49 12.25 
Stock-Yogo 10% bias 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 
No. Of Observations 2,918 2,918 2,918 2,918 2,918 2,708 
(1) All regressions include full set of regressors as in columns (2) and (4) of Table 3. 
(2) Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at sub-district (DSD) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 6: Female Labor Force Participation and Wages: By Age Cohorts 
 
 
Female Labor Force 
Participation Log( Real Wage) 
 
Older 
Women Younger Women 
Older 
Women 
Younger 
Women 
 
(age=>40yr)  (25-40yr) (age=>40yr)  (25-40yr) 
  2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 2SLS 
Proportion of Area Under LDO 1.327*** 0.855** -1.656** -1.344* 
  (2.818) (2.261) (-2.109) (-1.773) 
Instrument Strength  
    Kleibergen-Paap/Angrist Pischke F 12.59 11.24 11.83 13.14 
Stock-Yogo 10% max. rel. IV bias 9.08 9.08 9.08 9.08 
No. of observation 4,352 7,017 1,205 1,867 
(1) All regressions include full set of regressors as in columns (2) and (4) of Table 3. 
(2) Robust t statistics in parentheses. Standard errors corrected for clustering at sub-district (DSD) 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
 
Table A.1: Summary Statistics 
 
      
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. 
Labor force participation rate  0.51 1 0.50 
Female Wage (annual in rupees) 51132.75 36962.05 44145.32 
Proportion of Area Under LDO Leases 0.11 0.05 0.14 
Travel Time to Large City (hour) 2.60 1.99 2.43 
Share of Sinhalese in population 0.86 0.93 0.18 
Malaria incidence (spleen rate) 22.77 12.20 20.71 
P.Vivax (1000) 0.05 0.01 0.11 
P.Fac. (1000) 0.01 0.00 0.03 
Rainfall (000 metre) 2412.32 2268.71 800.49 
Slope (%) 10.74 7.38 9.09 
River within 5 km (yes=1) 0.35 0.00 0.48 
Share of land allocated to paddy 0.36 0.29 0.29 
Age (Year) 37.29 37 7.62 
Education Level (year) 8.30 10 3.82 
Married (yes=1) 0.83 1 0.38 
Number of Infant/Toddlers (< 1 year) 0.38 0 0.61 
Number of Infant/Toddlers (1-5year) 0.94 1 1.02 
Christian (yes=1) 0.05 0 0.22 
Muslim (yes=1) 0.05 0 0.21 
Buddist (yes=1) 0.83 1 0.38 
Moor (yes=1) 0.05 0 0.21 
Tamil (yes=1) 0.08 0 0.28 
Estate (yes=1) 0.08 0 0.28 
 
